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Abstract
A place is needed for a 'cognitive iconology' within "visual
culture." Like Logical Positivism before it, visual culture must
reexamine its tacit assumption that conflation of psycho-
sociological contributions to visual meaning is an adequate
methodology, and that sociologism is a worthwhile overriding
philosophy. Cognitive iconology isolates the psychological
contribution to the study of images and does not monopolize it
but isolates the foundational basis for it on which narrower
interpretations must be built. With examples from the work of
Titian, it is shown how the cognitive and 'cultural' contributions
must work together to make meaning. Using the philosophy of
Maurice Mandelbaum, and the example of Rudolf Arnheim and
his analysis of visual art, a foundational approach of cognitive
iconology to visual culture is sketched.
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1. Introduction
"Visual culture" is an egalitarian term that usefully unites
practitioners from different disciplines to study jointly the
communication by means of visual signs. As an art historian I
applaud the opportunity to work more closely with
psychologists, anthropologists and semioticians. However, at
the same time I think it is useful to keep certain distinctions
separate in order to make this collaboration more fruitful. This
does not mean that an anthropologist is forever doomed to
give only the 'anthropological' aspect of visual culture (as the
art historian will be doomed to report on the 'art historical').
Rather I think it is useful for the anthropologist (and art
historian) to know when they begin practicing a certain kind of
theorizing of visual culture (to which both are welcome) and
when instead they move on to practice another variety. I shall
ultimately argue that a "cognitive iconology" will be
indispensable for visual culture as a foundation to, but not a
monopoly of, its resources.
'Cognitive,' 'perceptual' and 'psychological' are used here
interchangeably to refer to psychological facts of the science of
behavior (even though we are speaking mostly of sensory
perception) true of all human beings, necessarily instantiated
in, but not derivative, of culture.[1] We must simply begin
with the premise that there are psychological and societal
contributions that make up a communicative act. A naïve
conflationism, whether a pure mixture or a reductive
psychologism or sociologism, will simply stall productive
research. The missing psychological contribution to visual
culture is precisely what I am calling 'cognitive iconology':
'cognitive' as a psychological indicator and 'iconology' as a
reminder that the 'logic of images' includes both its historical
context and its psychological effects upon perceivers.
In this respect visual culture seems to be in a similar position
that the behavioral sciences were in thirty years ago.[2] Led
then by the power of the 'unity of science' thesis of the logical
positivists, psychologists and sociologists got together to mark
out a common territory simply called the 'behavioral.'
Unfortunately, this model of the complexity of science was
purely atomistic and the emergence of different levels of
behavior was simply predicated on new aggregates of
behavioral units. Thus 'sociology' was simply that aspect of the
behavioral sciences that treated the emergent aspects of
people aggregated together - groups.
The weakness of this position can be seen in an extreme view
of the tasks of psychology and sociology. How an individual
deals with social stress, his or her individual symptoms and
feelings, and methods of coping are obviously psychological,
whereas the ways in which large-scale movements of groups
in society lead to conflict is obviously sociological. What is the
benefit of running these two entities together?
Today there are Departments of Communications that
institutionalize a demarcational ambiguity. The simple
existence of a hybrid discipline alone, however, should not
offend us. After all, communication is one of the most urgent
tasks before twenty-first century society and academic
departments ought to train people to use all the resources at
their command to promote it. What is objectionable is once
again this carried-over conception of the Unity of Science.
More specifically, the highly influential watered-down
empiricism found in the quantitative methods of
communications is objectionable. According to empiricism, we
are justified in running together all communicative activity
because it is all subject to statistical regularity and controlled
prediction.[3] Statistical regularity is phenomenal and is not a
very impressive goal of a science that ought to look for
generative mechanisms. Furthermore, as much post-positivist
philosophy of science has argued, prediction is not symmetrical
with explanation and there is no reason communications as a
science need include prediction in its purview to remain
scientific.[4]
2. Conflationism
All of this is merely to take us back to visual culture to
reexamine its positions, since it seems in its most conspicuous
guises to espouse conflationism.[5] Upon closer inspection,
however, it can be seen to practice a conflation of a peculiar
kind. Instead of making psychology and sociology meet
somewhere in the middle as in the 'behavioral sciences,' visual
culture tends to be reductive in the direction of sociologism.
Its strategy has been to demote the individual authority of
visual signs in order to make them indexes of social
movements. This was made clear ten years ago when Mieke
Bal and Norman Bryson wrote that "the basic tenet of
semiotics [which can stand in here for visual culture]. . .is
antirealist," and this mandate was reaffirmed recently by
Robert Nelson when he wrote that: "visuality belongs to the
humanities or social sciences because its effects, contexts,
values, and intentions are socially constructed."[6] It is this
sense of conflationism I propose to resist with a space staked
out for 'cognitive iconology.'
Let us take the case of a painting to see the consequences of
such a view. Titian's Venus of Urbino (click to view illustration)
in the Galleria degli Uffizi in Florence was painted in 1538 for
the wedding of the future Duke and Duchess of Urbino
(Guidobaldo II della Rovere and Giulia Varano), and depicts a
reclining nude.[7] Approaching this image in terms of visual
culture as a generic term means, presumably, that we muster
the various tools necessary to understand it as a token of
sixteenth-century visuality. This includes the contemporary's
habits in consuming images of women, beliefs about marriage,
notions of the power and efficacy of images and the charge of
domestic spaces that would hold such a work. It can be seen
that these various influences are extrinsic to the work, which
remains a passive vessel awaiting illumination.
However, we run into an analogous problem as the
psychological and sociological manifestations of "social stress"
mentioned above. Not only will the question of Titian's feel of
the relationship of compositional elements be quite different
from his Venetian attitudes about erotic imagery in sixteenth
century society, they will not be asked under the current slant
of Visual Cultural discourse. Once again, we have to ask: what
is the value of conflating these different aspects of the image?
There are some very good reasons for this conflationism. In
refusing to lay boundaries, which may turn out anyway to be
motivated by ideological disputes, visual culture can rest safe
in not prematurely 'essentializing' its object of study. And in
laying emphasis on the social nexus of culture, it can appear
even more forcefully to do this. But I hope we can see the
dangers here, when visual culture becomes a strange
bedfellow of the positivism that it so universally despises in
adopting a more current view of behavioral science.
The danger can be seen best in the example of Anthony
Giddens, no poststructuralist of the kind that tends to inspire
the visual culture community, but still close enough to their
concerns to be instructive.[8] Giddens is most famous for
espousing the 'duality of structure' by theorizing how agents
both act voluntaristically and instantiate social structure by
reproducing practices at the same time. In such a perspective,
one cannot separate people from groups. The simplicity of
individualism or holism is rejected in favor of a more
complicated series of encultured individuals.
Giddens is about as horrified by sociological dualism (agent-
society) as visual culture is of distinct meaning systems. But as
interesting as Giddens makes cultural life with his process
ontology, it possesses major conceptual shortcomings of the
sort that could potentially endanger visual culture as well.
Conflationism does not allow for the theorization of the
subject's influence by society, and vice versa, because the two
terms are not given any reality. This is all well and good until
we realize that critique ends immediately. One cannot
investigate the effect of a hypothetical social power on an
individual who is held in brackets.[9]
3. Dualism
At this point I think it is absolutely essential that we make use
of a strongly ontological conception of a natural and a social
science. This lies in the ontological properties of the "societal
facts" at the disposal of the social sciences. Statements made
regarding societal facts are irreducible to statements of, for
example, psychological facts. Conversely, psychological,
biological and physical facts have other relationships of
emergence to one another but the significant fact is that, in
contrast to societal facts that only have application within their
particular social group, the other facts pertain equally to all
people.
In a classic argument, Maurice Mandelbaum noted that if a
Trobriand islander walks into a bank, and observes someone
else withdrawing money, the only way that they will
understand the transaction (or even know that it is a
transaction) is by being informed of certain societal facts or
rules upon which the transaction depends.[10] These facts
would include the fact that a bank is a savings institution and
that upon the demonstration of a savings book these savings
may be withdrawn, and that the level of savings
correspondingly goes down. When one attempts to take such
facts and reduce them to psychological terms, one finds that
they possess a "gestalt" character, they are super-summative
and cannot be reduced to the parts or individual acts
themselves.[11]
What is suggested here is that we distinguish between the
natural and social sciences by the fact that the social sciences
deal with societal facts irreducible to their individual cultures
or sub-cultures while the natural sciences deal with facts
common to all people. This separation also changes the
burden of being a science. Even though the facts of a physics
experiment are universal in all circumstances, we do not
expect the physicist to explain how the conditions of the
experiment came about (his or her sociological pressure to
choose this kind of experiment over another). Likewise, we do
not expect sociology to explain how the scientist's metabolism
operates as s/he handles the experimental equipment. It
follows that such demarcational foregrounding will be an
important factor for productive studies of culture and, by
extension, visual culture.
With what has been said, we can briefly think about how these
elements might work in practice. An excellent example of the
balancing of contributions in a single model is the cross-
cultural theories of J. W. Berry.[12] He attempts to explain
variations in perceptual abilities in different cultures based on
the "Law of Cultural Differentiation": "Cultural factors
prescribe what shall be learned and at what age; consequently
different cultural environments lead to the development of
different patterns of ability." But instead of viewing his cross-
cultural psychology as the mere registration of perceptual
differences, he provides a model which takes into account the
environment (ecology), basic principles of seeing and then
cultural practices unique to the society.
Another example is the work by Dan Sperber and Deirdre
Wilson on "relevance theory" in linguistics.[13] In distinction to
"code theories" of cultural communication, they take for
granted the psychological assumption that we seek meaning in
communication ('relevance') to serve as the basis of
sociolinguistic investigation. Here relevance theory does not
usurp sociolinguistics but makes for a more credible, larger
theory of communication. Sperber and Wilson's semiotic
concerns are quite close to visual culture and can serve as an
important model.
Unfortunately, it is rare that researchers are as self-conscious
as Berry, Sperber and Wilson. But it points to the possibility
that pluralistic work can continue in visual culture, not because
"anything goes," but more accurately because different
discourses actually fit together if they do not claim exclusivity.
A surprising source for this can be seen in discussions of the
Gaze, where I believe that the under-girding of the literal,
spatial or "positional" gaze and the Lacanian, psychoanalytic
gaze (to borrow from the distinction of James Elkins)
demonstrate what I am saying.[14]
4. The Cognitive Gaze
The psychoanalytic gaze has been developed as a component
of Lacanian notions of subjectivity. The gaze represents the
mirror-like view into the linguistic order, which reciprocally
reinforces encultured subjectivity. In his analysis of Poussin's
paintings, David Carrier notes how the French artist frustrates
identification between subjects and also the viewer.[15]
Poussin ultimately frustrates desire, the Lacanian name for the
yearning toward closure of subjectivity and its mirror.
What is interesting about Carrier's analysis and others similar
to it is the necessity of a positional analysis of gazes in a more
literal sense that can underlie the psychoanalytic analysis.
That is, Carrier must first sketch the relations of viewing and
unreturned gazes (blindness) between the various figures of
the image and their relation as a whole to the spectatorship of
the viewer before he can outline the consequences for
Poussin's attitudes to desire. Carrier hastens to stress that he
is not a "formalist," but the point I am trying to make is that it
may not so much be a matter of formalism vs. a Lacanian-
informed notion of desire, but rather two parallel analyses of
the Gaze that necessitate and reinforce each other. In fact,
without the prior effect of the positional gazes, the Lacanian
analysis would not be possible.
5. The Sociological Percept
These last observations look to expand a Visual Cultural
analysis 'downward,' but we can do the same thing in a
direction 'upward.' For example, it is often said that the
psychology of art of Rudolf Arnheim is too naïve for present
concerns in the analysis of images.[16] The same David
Carrier writes how "Arnheim's essentially ahistorical way of
thinking. . . treats art from all cultures as immediately
accessible right now."[17] However, Arnheim is merely the
most distinguished proponent of 'cognitive iconology' as
utilized in its proper place.
Arnheim indeed outlines perceiving principles that he believes
are operative for the artistic traditions of all people (i.e.,
psychologically). However, he does not exactly say that
interpretation ends with what he says. It is true that he has
never shown how his approach will ultimately mesh with a
socio-historical account (as Gombrich, for example, has). But
as long as Arnheim does not rule out a realistic (i.e., causally
efficacious) sociological element, there is the potential that he
is simply maintaining disciplinary boundaries, rather than
laying a large stake in interpretation.
If this is true then we should not be so hasty to oppose
approaches per se as if they are concrete interpretations. That
is to say, we ought to be able to agree that two different
authors are not so much disagreeing with one another but
offering different facets of the explanation of the image, that
may or may not be true for that facet. It can be agreed that
some such psychological explanation of the visual image is
necessary for an explanation, in addition to a sociological
explanation, but in its present form is not acceptable.
The reader may complain that this is merely a logical
distinction of little value. I agree that more often than not a
psychologically faceted explanation and a sociologically faceted
explanation are actually warring psychologistic and
sociologistic explanations. Arnheim's discussion of the
development of Picasso's Guernica based largely on the
unfolding of formal factors will not please others with more
ideologically motivated interpretations of the work.[18] He
believes that only this initial exhaustion of the formal origin of
the work can serve an adequate social reading.
But it is of the utmost importance that Arnheim is not denying
the sociological (just as his opponent ought not to deny the
psychological). Rather, it is causally inactive in his account. In
other words, the explanation brings with it an implicit model of
sociological (or conversely psychological) activity that in that
case happens to be unimportant. In the Poussin example, the
positional or cognitive structure of gazes and spectatorship
made the more elaborate psychoanalytic interpretation
possible but did not exhaust it. Conversely, Arnheim's
interpretation of Guernica exposed certain cognitive facts that
constrain any other interpretation.
Recalling this fact keeps before our eyes the need to think in
terms of unified explanation. As soon as we oppose the
'formalist' and the 'semiotic' (or positivist and postmodern)
interpretation we have sacrificed the complexity of the world
and falsified the nature of our task of understanding visual
culture.
6. An Example: Titian
With all this said, I want to return to my example of Titian's
Venus of Urbino to see what advantages such demarcational
foregrounding may bring. As noted, there are literally dozens
of ways to approach this image. There is the diachronic debt of
Titian to previous Venetian exemplars of reclining Venuses,
most notably Palma Vecchio and Giorgione. There is also the
diachronic tradition of wedding symbolism - roses, myrtle,
cassoni, and a dog - discussed ably by Rona Goffen.[19] A
proponent of visual culture might be attracted to non-canonical
readings of the work, those that do not stress so much Titian's
formal development but the debt of the painting to popular
imagery or a new, repressed content (as in Goffen's racy
reading that this wedding gift features Venus masturbating
herself as an augur to the young couple).
As stated before, all of these broad approaches stress social
content at the peril of the humble perceptual-psychological.
One might even take the recent arguments of Thomas
Puttfarken's The Discovery of Pictorial Composition: Theories
of Visual Order in Painting 1400-1800 as evidence that we
have overstated the importance of visual composition,
especially in the Renaissance, since works of this era were
largely monumental and were more interested in relating to
the viewer than balancing artfully their inner contents.[20]
This would be a mistake, as a careful reading of Puttfarken
also reveals.
As I have stated, some psychological contribution is necessary
because it is causally active in determining the further form or
meaning of the work. This can be as trivial as saying that any
social content must find its way to our minds through our
senses but obviously there is more at stake. For any gesture,
outlay of objects, or focusing is subject to the laws of
perception that can and must be invoked to explain the
conduit for the symbolism lying behind it.
Arnheim has not discussed Titian's Venus in print, but as a
means of provoking discussion, his analysis of another nude,
Goya's La Maja Desnuda (1797; click for illustration) in the
Prado, is intriguing. Arnheim notes how the large visual center
of the nude's head is reinforced with the knowing glance at the
viewer, underscoring the activity of the mind behind it, but the
visual center of the work places interest instead on the
sexuality of the woman.[21] Inherent in the very composition
of the work is a sophisticated statement of conflict between
mind and body. This is a relatively low level of meaning that
seems secure but admittedly says little about Goya, his ideas
or his times. But this elementary meaning can support and
undergird further levels of meaning that we may wish to find in
the work.
As it turns out, although it is true that most of Titian's output
was monumental paintings for altars, the Venus is easily a
bedroom picture, smallish and more intimate, and therefore
(according to Puttfarken's criteria) more susceptible to active
composing in the contemporary sense. As Puttfarken shows
with another of his examples from Titian, another work can
convincingly be claimed to have been prematurely analyzed in
simple compositional terms, Titian's Ca' Pesaro Altarpiece
(1527; click for illustration) in the Franciscan church of Santa
Maria Gloriosa dei Frari in Venice. But this work is especially
enlightening for the importance and limits of an Arnheim-style
compositional analysis. From head-on, the work is confusing
because of the two columns that seem to cry out for
interpretation. They upset the balance and have led all the
way from suspecting they were later additions (conservation
shows they were not), hailing Titian for his off-balance
"baroque" composition, to a special iconographic significance
referring to the Immaculate Virgin as the "Gate of Heaven."
Puttfarken notes how this side chapel is approached along the
nave of the church from an oblique angle and when seen from
this position the two columns fit into a perspectival scheme
weakly carrying on (since the columns don't exactly match) the
actual interior of the church. So the old fashioned formal
analyses of the composition were wrong after all.
Is composition as a category overthrown? The facts Puttfarken
is discussing are still perceptual (psychological): the work has
not been seen from the proper distance and angle. No doubt
the importance of photographs rather than in situ study of
works of art has contributed to the puzzle of the painting. But
the very principles that Arnheim (or some other psychologist)
might muster for an analysis of the composition seen dead-on
are just as applicable instead to the picture in a larger physical
context. The issue here is the contemporaneity of perceptual
forces acting together. They can act together with a simple
direct view, or they can act together from a different view. But
the nature of the act - perceptual viewing - has not changed,
only the larger spatial context.
If this is so, we can say that a perceptual-compositional
analysis of Titian's Ca' Pesaro Altarpiece from the simple direct
view is correct but trivial because it says nothing about the
real placement of the painting. Ironically, all of the elaborate
iconographical interpretations of the work have relied on an
implicit compositional idea of the picture that turns out to be
wrong. Puttfarken's oblique view, on the other hand (and
assuming that his convincing argument is correct) has found
the correct, causally efficacious perceptual view. It is this view
that undergirds any further social-iconographical meaning we
wish to find in the picture.
7. Conclusion
Finally returning to the Venus, I hope it is clear that the way
in which anything that claims to be an "interpretation" of the
work is not social at the peril of the psychological (or vice
versa). Any such interpretation must presume an implicit
psychological (or sociological) model. This should be
foregrounded in studies of visual culture because it ought to
aim for hybrid, causally realistic models of the communicative
process. The sociologistic biases of visual culture are masked
as a methodological circumspection that becomes,
nevertheless, a disguised form of essentialism. To understand
any phenomenon under study we have to call upon all the
resources that are available to us. This will require a
naturalistic dialogue about the ways in which different
discourses fit together, as they must, for a unified picture of
the meaning of a visual artifact. 'Cognitive iconology' takes as
its object of study an important, but by no means the most
important, set of these forces.
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